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Is the Arab spring reflected in autumn on

August 29, 2012

The International Center for Crisis Management (Crisis Group), based in Brussels has published a report on the state of "Hamas" the Palestinian movement by showing that this movement has not faced challenges in its history, such as that emerged with the Arab uprisings. The report says that Hamas has abandoned his headquarters in Damascus, to the detriment of its relations with other countries that support, Iran, improves relations with U.S. allies like Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. When asked to identify which side he wants to be in the regional conflict, it has not chosen sides.
The developments came from the ranks of Hamas to unprecedented levels and have focused on how to respond to regional changes in the short term. Hamas leaders in the West Bank and in exile think with the receipt of "Muslim brothers" power in Egypt in particular and the West reconciliation with Islamists in general and it is time to take bold measures to unify Palestine and facilitate the integration of international and regional Hamas. This new dynamic rising Islamist-regional level, and change the positions of the United States and the European Union towards them, and hesitation that prevails in the Palestinian wing of the Islamist-offer opportunities for Hamas and the West. But take this opportunity demand more proof of pragmatism and realism that both parties are shown so far.
The Arab uprisings could produce a much more severe Hamas in the years that preceded stagnant these uprisings, Hamas was in trouble, it was diplomatically isolated and economically limited between Egypt and Israel and repressed by the Israeli security forces and forces of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and is barely able to stop managing the process of ceasefire with an enemy more powerful, and is not able to respond to popular demands to achieve reconciliation with Fatah in an unenviable position in Gaza, where we saw some fans they are smeared with inherent contradictions as it is an Islamic movement restricted by the needs of the administration and the secular resistance movement strongly opposes attacks Gaza against Israel. The international report shows: that with the decrease of its popularity since the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 that led to power, Hamas had to face the criticism inside and outside, where the owner of the first is divided by a small but important group of activists who left to join the groups most committed to the implementation of the Islamic Sharia and to engage in attacks against Israel.
It seems that the Arab revolutions have changed all that. positive developments that have emerged in the region: the overthrow strong ally "Fatah", Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the increase of the strongest supporters of the Hamas movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, opening of the Rafah crossing between Gaza and the Sinai, which was the control of the use of ancient Egypt to put pressure on what was considered illegal Gaza leaders restrict their movement and impoverishment, allowing Islamist parties in other countries, the growing instability in countries where large Muslim opposition, promise the emergence of a new regional system more democratic reflecting the widespread hostility Israel and its allies and public sympathy with Hamas.
From the point of view of Hamas, these events have been promising to have a profound impact on the achievement of all its fundamental objectives: the primacy of the Gaza Strip, which weakens the grip of "Fatah" in the West Bank, the deployment Islamic values in society, to end its diplomatic isolation, strengthens regional alliances of Israel. The report of the Centre for International Crisis Management Hamas confirmed that these regional changes have a price. The most important thing is that the uprising in Syria, which is the seat of the political bureau of the movement for more than a decade, was placed in front of one of the movements of the biggest challenges faced and torn between conflicting requirements. On the one hand, the movement had to balance the gratitude she felt towards the regime he had supported when all other Arab countries have disavowed, and the cost to cut ties with the regime still clings to power, and the risk of angering Iran, the largest funders and providers of money, weapons and training. On the other hand, Hamas thought its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia in general, and debt carried by the Syrian people, which have long resisted this movement. And it should take into account the balance between these considerations are the obligations of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in Syria. The report indicates that, in addition to the inherent difficulty of balancing these considerations foreign Arab uprisings imposed on the movement a challenge that is no less difficult when it shows the deep internal contradictions and conflicts between different components. The dilemma Hamas suffered by the Arab uprisings has allowed the movement to preserve the many differences in their environment under the surface with the lack of opportunities available to them. But as soon as Hamas found itself in a radically different environment facing new challenges and opportunities, underlying tensions have emerged to the surface and created new forms of friction among them. In general, this is due to several overlapping factors: the geographical movement and the various accounts of his leadership and caused by different conditions (in the Gaza Strip, and in prison, and West Bank and abroad), the ideological distinctions, including those relating to evaluations of impact of various Arab uprisings, the different roles of political and military activities, religious and administrative, and personal rivalries that existed before. According to the notice of the report: domestic competition appeared to Hamas in the clearest forms and publicly on the issue of Palestinian reconciliation, because they are a prerequisite for the Palestinians and affects a large number of the most strategic encountered significant movement, including integration within the PLO and the Palestinian Authority control, and to the security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the formation of a strategy common with "Fatah", and the ultimate political position of Hamas to Israel. The report stresses that international conflicts are internal Hamas national strategy, in particular the extent to which must be entered in the reconciliation talks.
In general, the strategic division corresponds to two points of view, which are also linked to two different interests: on the one hand, and because changes in regional plays in favor of Hamas, so the movement should only stick to its position of waiting to weaken the Palestinian Authority and the improvement of economic conditions in Gaza, on the other hand, we must seize this rare opportunity to make difficult decisions that can bring long-term gains. The report notes that while Hamas was likely influenced by third parties, the West can not overestimate his influence, the Islamic movement is uncertain in the event of a change, but would not abandon their core positions, as an attempt to forced to accept the Quartet's conditions is totally unacceptable. Instead, working in coordination with Egypt and others, the United States and the European Union have launched an investigation that is not limited to changes in public statements, and of practical value and not an onerous burden for Hamas. These changes include the entry in the cease-fire more formally with Israel in Gaza and efforts to help achieve stability in Sinai, which identified the importance criticized throughout the attack (August 5, 2012) Egyptian soldiers and confirmation, in the context of a national unity agreement, the term of President Mahmoud Abbas on the final status agreement with Israel and agree to respect the outcome of the referendum, which will be presented to the Palestinians such an agreement. In contrast, Hamas may benefit from maintenance warranties Israel about a cease-fire in Gaza and to improve the economic situation in the sector, and assurances from the United States and the European Union that they engage with the Government of National Unity and implement these commitments. It is known that Egypt - even under the domination of the Muslim Brotherhood - objectively shared interests with Israel on all the issues raised above: we want to see the return of calm in Gaza, they prefer the calm continues to Sinai as she was also asked to do this in a military campaign in response to the attack on August 5, 2012 and may also benefited from the resumption of negotiations under the auspices of Abbas, who could help eliminate the one of the nagging questions in the United States, Egypt, and improve regional climate and pave the way for a new peace process. Why cannot there be an attempt to capitalize on this situation? The report noted that this has happened twice before and after the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and after the agreement of national unity in Mecca in 2007 - when the international community missed an opportunity in its approach to Hamas, and policies produced almost the opposite is expected: when reinforced Hamas takeover of Gaza, serious clashes erupted with Israel not be enhanced "Fatah" broken democratic institutions in the West Bank approached the agreement peace verification.
With the arrival of a third occasion, a dramatic improvement in relations with the Islamic movements in the region, the West should be careful not to leave, and was attached to the floor, only to watch the beginning of a series of events.




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